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Abstract
Default configuration of various software applications often neglects security objectives. We
tested the default configuration of TLS in dozen web and application servers. The results show that
“secure by default” principle should be adopted more broadly by developers and package maintain-
ers. In addition, system administrators cannot rely blindly on default security options.
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1 Introduction
Security often depends on prudent configuration of software components used in a deployed system.
All necessary security controls and options are there, but one have to turn them on or simply start
using them. Unfortunately, the “If it ain’t broke, don’t fix it” philosophy or a lack of expertise wins
sometimes. The technology is deployed in a default configuration or configuration that fulfills (mostly
functional) requirements with as few changes as possible.
Secure by default is a well known security principle, see e.g. [4]:
Technology which is Secure by Default has the best security it can without you even knowing
it’s there, or having to turn it on.
We should aim to provide software packages with safe defaults and turning them to less secure config-
uration should require a deliberate effort, see e.g. [5]:
There are many ways to deliver an “out of the box” experience for users. However, by default,
the experience should be secure, and it should be up to the user to reduce their security – if
they are allowed.
The Transport Layer Security (TLS) and its predecessor Secure Socket Layer (SSL) are widely used
protocols for ensuring confidentiality and integrity of transported data, as well as one or two-sided
authentication of communicating parties. There are various versions of the protocols and extensions
proposed and implemented during more than 20 years of using SSL/TLS. Meanwhile, many flaws, both
theoretical and practical were found in the design and implementation of the protocols [3, 6]. New
weaknesses are constantly found; in recent years we have seen DROWN [2] or LOGJAM [1]. It is
not easy to stay focused, understand the flaws and mitigate them in a timely fashion. Moreover, the
compatibility with client software (web browsers) should be considered.
We tested dozen web and application servers for default SSL/TLS configuration to see how the
principle of secure defaults is applied in this context. We used the default configuration of the servers,
and we made minimal changes to enable SSL/TLS, usually pointing to private key and public certificate
file(s). We used an excellent tool testssl.sh by Dirk Wetter [8] designed for testing servers for security
weaknesses in their SSL/TLS configuration.
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The results are not surprising. We observed diverse combinations of default settings. The “secure
by default” principle is followed rarely. Detailed results are presented in Section 3. Let us emphasize
that different versions of the servers or even the same versions packaged for another operating system
or distribution can use different defaults, thus leading to different results.
2 Test environment
The test environment was based on Ubuntu 16.04 LTS distribution with up-to-date updates. We chose
popular, well-known web and applications servers as well as some small players in this area. Some
servers were installed from available Ubuntu repositories, some were downloaded as binaries from
projects’ web sites, some were compiled from source code, and puma (a Ruby web server) was installed
via RubyGems. Table 1 summarizes all twelve servers, their versions, and how they were obtained. In
some cases, namely for gunicorn and puma, a minimal “Hello world!” application was created.
server version comment
apache 2.4.18 package for Ubuntu 16.04
caddy 0.10.4 dowloaded from caddyserver.com
glassfish 4.1.2 downloaded from javaee.github.io/glassfish
gunicorn 19.4.5 package for Ubuntu 16.04
hiawatha 10.6 downloaded from www.hiawatha-webserver.org, compiled
jetty 9.2.14 package for Ubuntu 16.04
lighttpd 1.4.35 package for Ubuntu 16.04
nginx 1.10.3 package for Ubuntu 16.04
openlitespeed 1.4.26 downloaded from open.litespeedtech.com, compiled
puma 3.9.1 installed via “gem install puma”
tomcat 8.0.32 package for Ubuntu 16.04
wildfly 10.1.0 downloaded from wildfly.org
Table 1: Versions of tested servers
Most of the servers allow fine-grained configuration of TLS support. We intentionally use the
default configuration and made only minimal changes to enable TLS (following a documentation in
this regard). It is not uncommon to see administrators applying such approach when managing IT
systems. The tool testssl.sh [8] was used for comprehensive test of each server’s TLS configuration.
3 Results
The results are presented in a series of tables with comments. We use marks Xand × to indicate sup-
ported/unsupported feature or immunity/susceptibility to a vulnerability. Moreover, we indicate by red
color all those marks that we think the secure configuration should not have.
3.1 Protocol versions
There are several versions of SSL/TLS protocol. The good news is that both SSL versions (2.0 and 3.0)
are disabled by default in all tested servers. The situation is more interesting for TLS versions. The
majority of the servers, including “big names” like apache, nginx, tomcat or wildfly allow all three TLS
versions. Two web servers caddy and hiawatha do not enable TLS 1.0 by default, which is a right thing
to do. A specific case is gunicorn server — it accepts only TLS 1.0 by default. Detailed information is
shown in Table 2.
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server SSL (≤ 3.0) TLS 1.0 TLS 1.1 TLS 1.2
apache × X X X
caddy × × X X
glassfish × X X X
gunicorn × X × ×
hiawatha × × X X
jetty × X X X
lighttpd × X X X
nginx × X X X
openlitespeed × X X X
puma × X X X
tomcat × X X X
wildfly × X X X
Table 2: Default support for SSL/TLS protocol versions
3.2 Ciphers
Web servers should set a reasonable cipher order for supported ciphers. Some of the tested servers do
not define their cipher order at all (again, in their default configuration). Another serious weakness
is using NULL cipher or obsolete export-grade ciphers — this happens in one server (gunicorn). Few
servers offer weak 128-bit ciphers (RC4 or SEED). An interesting situation is the default support for
TripleDES algorithm — a clear consensus is missing. A prudent approach is to turn it off.
server Cipher order N/A/E(1) LOW(2) Weak(3) TripleDES High(4) AEAD(5)
apache × ×/×/× × × × X X
caddy X ×/×/× × × × X X
glassfish × ×/×/× × × X X X
gunicorn × X/X/× × X X X ×
hiawatha X ×/×/× × × × X X
jetty × ×/×/× × × X X X
lighttpd X ×/×/× × X × X ×
nginx X ×/×/× × × × X X
openlitespeed X ×/×/× × × × X X
puma X ×/×/× × × × X X
tomcat × ×/×/× × × X X X
wildfly × ×/×/× × × X X X
(1) NULL or Anonymous NULL or Export ciphers
(2) LOW — DES or 64-bit ciphers
(3) Weak 128-bit ciphers like IDEA, SEED, RC4 etc.
(4) Strong ciphers without AEAD
(5) AEAD (Authenticated Encryption with Associated Data) ciphers
Table 3: Categories of ciphers enabled/offered (indicated by X)
A positive fact is that all servers support some cipher suites offering PFS (Perfect forward secrecy).
3.3 Vulnerabilities
Not all vulnerabilities are equally dangerous. For example, not implementing TLS Fallback Signaling
Cipher Suite Value or accepting ciphers in CBC mode (potentially vulnerable to LUCKY13, though the
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timing side channels are often already fixed in underlying TLS implementations) is less serious than
accepting RC4 cipher or using common group of small order (LOGJAM). In some cases, the web browser
used by a user determines whether the weakness is a valid threat. For example, the BEAST attack is
prevented in sufficiently recent browser versions (by 1/n-1 record splitting). SSL Labs does not even
track this vulnerability in their SSL Pulse anymore [7].
Table 4 contains results for the following vulnerabilities: Heartbleed (CVE-2014-0160), CCS (CVE-
2014-0224), Secure Renegotiation (CVE-2009-3555), Secure Client-InitiatedRenegotiation, CRIME (CVE-
2012-4929), BREACH (CVE-2013-3587), POODLE (CVE-2014-3566), TLS FALLBACK SCSV (RFC 7507),
SWEET32 (CVE-2016-2183, CVE-2016-6329), FREAK (CVE-2015-0204), DROWN (CVE-2016-0800, CVE-
2016-0703), LOGJAM (CVE-2015-4000), BEAST (CVE-2011-3389), LUCKY13 (CVE-2013-0169), RC4 (CVE-
2013-2566, CVE-2015-2808). We do not explain the vulnerabilities in detail, a curious reader can find
additional information in corresponding CVEs, RFCs and references therein.
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apache X X X X X ×(a) X X X X X ×(b-14) × × X
caddy X X X X X X X X X X X X X × X
glassfish X X X × X X X × × X X ×(b-2) × × X
gunicorn X X X × X X X × × X X X × × ×
hiawatha X X X X X ×(a) X X X X X ×(b-r) X × X
jetty X X X × X X X × × X X ×(b-2) × × X
lighttpd X X X X X ×(a) X X X X X X × × ×
nginx X X X X X ×(a) X X X X X ×(b-n) × × X
openlitespeed X X X X X ×(a) X X X X X X × × X
puma X X X × X X X X X X X X × × X
tomcat X X X X X X X × × X X ×(b-2) × × X
wildfly X X X × X X X × × X X ×(b-2) × × X
(a) gzip compression of “/” path
(b-2) no DH EXPORT but common group is used (Oakley Group 2, 1024-bit)
(b-14) no DH EXPORT but common group is used (Oakley Group 14, 2048-bit)
(b-r) no DH EXPORT but common group is used (RFC5114/2048-bit group)
(b-n) no DH EXPORT but common group is used (nginx/1024-bit group)
(c) indicates ciphers in CBC mode (not actual existence of timing side channels)
Table 4: Default configuration potentially vulnerable (×) or not (X)
4 Conclusion
We tested dozenweb and application servers for security of their default TLS configuration. The results
show that “secure by default” principle is seldom followed in this, and probably other areas as well. The
system administrators cannot rely blindly on default security options. This increases the (hopefully
obvious) importance of thorough review and setting of security configuration.
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